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SPEECH
OF

WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
ON,

THE CLAIMS OF AMERICAN MERCHANTS FOR INDEMNITIES
FOR

FRENCH SPOLIATIONS.
[Delivered in the Senate of the United States^ January 21, 1851.]

Mr. President : While no lawful public engagement ought ever to be
ibroken, debts founded on the appropriation of private property to the gen
eral use, and especially to the discharge of obligations incurred in the war
of the Revolution, are practically guarantied by the Constitution, and. are
.stamped with a peculiar equity. They ought, therefore, to be held as sa
cred as the safety of the State itself. The claims before us fall within that
•class of inviolable obligations.
The peace of Paris, in 1763, reduced the broad possessions of France
in America to Cayenne on the continent, and the islands of St. Domingo,
Martinique, Guadaloupe, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Tobago, Deseada, Marigalante, St. Pierre, Miquelon, Grenada, and Dominica, in the Atlantic
•ocean. Great Britain, at the same time, acquired the Canadas, together
with the vast region of New France, and thus secured to herself an empire
’extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Arctic circle.
In February, 1778, the new thirteen American States were struggling to
disengage themselves from that empire. It was a conflict ripened and final
between Great Britian to retain supreme dominion, and the United States
to acquire absolute'sovereignty and independence. Great Britian, so lately
victorious over her great continental rival, was now confessed mistress of
the seas. The United States had, then, a free population scarcely surpass
ing their present number of slaves. Their sovereignty had been assumed
<oniy nineteen months before, and had not yet been recognised by any
foreign nation, nor even by the least of the hundred savage tribes w'hom
the wilderness protected within and around their borders. They had no
navy, mercantile marine, fortifications, constitution, nor even confirmed
•confederation. The hopes which had been kindled by early successes
were almost extinguished by recent and successive disasters. Boston had,
indeed, been regained, and Burgoyne had given back the passes of the
North : but the enemy yet retained New York, and now victorious over
Washington in successive pitched battles, on fields chosen by himself, on
the Brandywine and at Germantown, was marching unobstructed towards
Philadelphia, then the American capital. The precious metals seemed to
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have hidden themselves again in the earth, and paper credits had every
where collapsed. The chaplain of Congress implored Washington “to
give over the ungodly war in which he was engaged.” The discomfited
army, without recruits, pay, or sufficient food, had tracked their way with
bleeding feet into winter quarters on the Schuylkill. Two hundred officers
had resigned and retired; the hospitals and the neighboring farmers’ fire
sides were crowded by soldiers without blankets or shoes; and the great
leader, in the midst of discontents fast growing into mutiny, announced to
the loosely constituted Legislature, which was now convulsed with dis
trust and faction, that “ unless some great and capital change should occur,
the troops under his care must starve, dissolve, or disperse.”
A great and capital change did occur. Allied armies, fresh, vigorous,
and well appointed, co-operating with a gallant fleet, met the invader, and
his surrender at Yorktown opened the way to peace, sovereignty, and inde
pendence. An auspicious star had led Franklin, Deane, and Lee, the first
of American ambassadors, to Paris ; and it was an alliance with France, a
hereditary foe, but thenceforth a fraternal nation, that wrought out this
great and capital change, and effected that triumphant consummation.
The courses of the allies immediately separated, and thenceforward
widely diverged. The United States completed their union in peace and
tranquillity, and established their Constitution on the unremovable founda
tions on which loyal citizens hope, and wise men throughout the world
believe, that it stands firmly fixed forever; while, by well-directed devotion
of the national revenues to the payment of their debts and the establish
ment of their credit, and a wise cultivation of arts and industry, they pre
pared the way for permanent and extended empire.
France, on the contrary, began the descent towards revolution in thevery year when the United States emerged from its dangerous labyrinths;
and thereafter, distracted herself, for thirteen years she convulsed all
Europe.
It was during this period that these claims for indemnities for spoliations
arose.
The political and commercial relations between France and the United
States had been defined by treaties.
First. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce, the most ancient treaty of the
United States, executed on the 6th of February, 1778. It stipulated [Art.
1] a firm, inviolable, universal, and perpetual peace. [Art. 2.] That all
commercial privileges to be granted by either party to any State should be
come common to the other contracting party. [Arts. 3 and 4.] The most
favored footing for each party in the other’s ports. [Arts. 5 and 6.] Re
ciprocal protection to vessels in their respective jurisdictions. [Art. 8.]
The aid of France in negotiations by the United States with the Barbary
Powers. [Art. 12.] The mutual exhibition-of passports and certificates of
cargo in cases of suspicious vessels making the ports of an enemy of one
of the parties. [Art. 14.] That goods of either party should be forfeited if
laden in ships of an enemy of the other. [Art. 17.] That armed vessels of
one party might freely carry prizes into the other's ports, without paying
duties to courts, and might freely depart to the places designated in their
commissions, and that neither party should give shelter to captors of prizes
from the other. [Art. 22.] That privateers of an enemy of one party
should not be allowed to be fitted out or to sell prizes in the ports of the
other. [Art. 23.] That free ships should make free goods. [Art. 24.]
Defined articles contraband of war, and excepted from that class many
articles not free by the law of nations. [Art. 25.] In case one party should
be at war, the vessels of the other should be furnished with sea letters, or
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passports, and with certificates containing the particulars of the cargo, so as
to relieve the rigors of search.
Secondly. The Treaty of Jllldance, concluded on the same day, February
6, 1778. In this treaty, the parties recited the execution of the Treaty
of Amity and Commerce, declared that they had considered the meansof strengthening-their engagements, particularly in case Great Britain,,
in resentment against those engagements, should break the peace wittP
France, either by direct hostilities or by hindering her cotnmerce and
navigation, contrary to the rights of nations and the peace subsisting ,
between those countries; and that therefore they had agreed,. that
[Art. 1] if war should break out between France and Great Britain,
during the continuance of the existing war between the United States
and England, that then his Majesty and the United States would make
it a common cause, and aid each other mutually with their good offices,.
their counsel, and their forces, as was becoming to good and faithful
allies. [Art. 2.] That the essential and direct end of their defensive
alliance was to maintain effectually the Liberty, Sovereignty,, and In
dependence, absolute and unlimited, of the United States of America, as
well in matters of government as of commerce. [Arts. 3 and 4.] ThaU
each party should make every effort to attain that end; and that they
should, in every possible way, act in concert, and with promptness and*
good faith. [Arts. 5, 6, and 7.] That France renounced, in favor of the
United States, conquests that might be made by the allied armies, exceptthe British Islands in or near the Gulf of Mexico. [Arts. 8 and 9.] Thatneither party should conclude a truce or peace without the other’s con-sent; and that neither party should demand any compensation from the
other. [Art. 11.] The two parties guarantied mutually, from, the date of'
the treaty forever against all other Powers, to wit—the United States to his
Most Christian Majesty the then existing possessions of the Crown ol
France in America, as well as those it might acquire by the treaty of peace.
And his Most Christian Majesty, on his own part, guarantied to the United
States their Liberty, Sovereignty, and Independence, absolute and unlim
ited, and also their possessions, and the additions or conquests that the
Confederation might obtain during the war, conformably to the 5th and 6th.
articles. [Art. 12.] In order to fix more precisely the application of the
preceding article, the contracting parties declared that, in case of a rup
ture between France and England, the reciprocal guaranty declared in that
article should have its full force and effect the moment such rupture should:
break out; and if such rupture should not take place, the mutual obliga
tions of the said guaranty should not commence until the moment of thecessation of the war then existing between the United States and England:
should have ascertained their possessions.
Thirdly. The Treaty called the Consular Convention, concluded on the
14th of November, 1788, containing the following articles :
“ Art. 8. The Consuls or Vice Consuls shall exercise police over all the vesselsof their respective nations ; and shall have, on board the said vessels, all power and
jurisdiction in civil matters, in all the disputes which may there arise. They shall
have an entire inspection over the said vessels, their crews, and the changes and
substitutions therein to be made; for which purpose they may go on board the said,
vessels whenever they may judge it necessary.”
“ Art. 12. All differences and suits between the subjects of the Most Christian,
King in the United States, or between the citizens of the United States within the.
dominions of the Most Christian King, and particularly all disputes relative to the
wages and terms of engagement of the crews of their respective vessels, and all the
differences, of whatever nature they be, which may arise between the privates of
the said crews, or between captains of different vessels of their nations, shall be
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determined by their respective Consuls. The officers of the country, civil or mili
tary, shall not interfere therein, or take any part whatever in the matter; and the
appeals from the said consular tribunals shall be carried before the tribunals of
France or of the United .States.”
The French Revolution began in 1789, and in 1793 it became a general
European war, in which France, while treading continually upon the fierc
est internal fires, bared her head to all the thunderbolts of Despotism.
Washington, by the serene tranquillity and majestic justice of his char
acter, repressed the sympathies of the United States for France and the
Republican cause, and sent forth his memorable proclamation : “ Whereas,”
said the President, “ it appears that a state of war exists between Austria,
Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands, of the one
part, and France, on the other, and the duty and interest of the United
States require that they should, with sincerity and good faith, adopt and
pursue a conduct friendly and impartial towards the belligerent Powers,
I have therefore thought fit, by these presents, to declare the disposition of
the United States to observe the conduct aforesaid.”
No less a character than Washington could have assumed neutrality in
such a crisis. Nor could even he protect it in that fierce conflict of armed
opinion which raged throughout Europe, as if all its separate and widely
different States had been one entire yet distracted commonwealth. The
cost of supplies rose two, three, and four fold, under the demands of the
belligerent nations. The United States put in motion, for once, and all at
once, the three wheels of industry, Production, Manufacture, and Ex
change, and wealth flowed in upon them like a spring tide. The com
batants, relapsing into the morality of the Barbary Powers, seized arid con
fiscated neutral ships and their cargoes. American commerce was thus
suddenly checked, and the revenues it yielded rapidly declined. Jefferson,
then'Secretary of State, met the enemy with a declaration—
“ I have it in charge from the President to assure the merchants of the United
States concerned in foreign commerce or navigation, that attention wifi be paid to
any injuries they may suffer on the high seas or in foreign countries, contrary to
the law of nations or to existing treaties; and that, on their forwarding hither wellauthenticated evidences of the same, proper proceedings will be adopted for their
relief.”
The American merchants, thus stimulated, prosecuted more diligently
than before a trade which yielded enticing profits, while its risks seemed
to have been underwritten by their country. The maritime injuries suffered
by Americans at the hands of France in the course of the'war were at the
time classified as follows :
First. Spoliations and mal-treatment of the vessels of American citizens
at sea, by French ships of war and privateers.
Second. A long and distressing embargo, which detained many Amer
ican vessels at Bordeaux in 1793 and 1794.
Third. The dishonor of bills and other evidences of debt due to Ameri
can citizens for supplies furnished, at the request of France, to herself and
to her West India Islands, in a period of famine and civil war.
Fourth. The seizure or forced sales of the cargoes of American vessels,
■and the appropriation of them to public uses.
Fifth. The non-performance of contracts for supplies, made by the
French authorities with American citizens.
.Sixth. The condemnation of American vessels and cargoes under ma
rine ordinances of France incompatible with treaties.
Seventh. Captures, in violation of the provisions of the commercial
treaty, of American vessels laden with provisions, bound to the ports of
tire enemy.
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To elucidate the nature of these injuries :
On the 9th of May, 1793, France authorized armed vessels and privateers
to arrest and bring into her ports neutral ships, laden wholly or in part
either with provisions belonging to neutral nations and destined to an en
emy’s ports, or with merchandise belonging to an enemy, and declared
that such merchandise should be lawful prize, while such provisions should
be paid for according to their value at the place of destination, and just
indemnification should be made for the freights and the detention of the
ships. This decree was alternately rescinded as to the United States, re
stored, rescinded again, and finally restored and left in full effect.
American vessels known and confessed, but found without passport or
certificate, in the exact form prescribed by the 22d article of the Treaty of
Amit}' and Commerce, were, by a decree of the 3d of March, 1797, de
clared lawful prizes.
On the 2d of July, 1796, France decreed that she would treat neutral
vessels, either as to confiscations, searches, or captures, in the same man
ner that they suffered the English to treat them—a decree that punished
with violence the endurance of aggression committed by another, while it
confided in the discretion of the second corsair to determine who, by be
coming victims of the first, had offended against so extraordinary a code..
On the 29th of October, 1799, France decreed that any native of an
allied or even of a neutral country, found wearing a hostile commission,
or serving in an enemy’s crew, should suffer as a pirate, without being
allowed to allege duress, by violence, menace, or otherwise.
Besides one hundred and three vessels w'hich were detained by the em
bargo at Bordeaux, there is a list of six hundred and nineteen which were
captured and plundered before 1800. The true number of spoliations is
said to have been three times greater. Contemporaneous expositions by
the authorities of the United States placed the aggregate of damages sus
tained by the, merchants at more than twenty millions of dollars. Of these ,
damages, portions amounting to about ten millions of dollars were adjusted
and paid chiefly under the convention of 1800, finally carried into effect by
the Louisiana treaty in 1803. The exact amount of damages due, however,
is not now in question. The bill before the Senate confines itself to un
adjusted claims to be actually proved, and awards only five millions, with
out interest, in satisfaction of all that shall be established.
The United States diligently prosecuted the claims from 1793 to 1800,
but France did not so long remain a mere respondent.
Edmund C. Genet, her minister, claimed, and actually assumed to fit
out privateers in American ports, to cruise against British vessels. Under
the 22d article of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, he demanded what,
in fact, were admiralty powers, for French consuls in American ports, by
virtue of article 8th of the Consular Convention ; while, under color of the
17th article of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, he insisted that French
vessels had a right to sell their prizes free from all duties in American
ports ; and, finally, he complained that British ships were permitted to
take French goods out of American vessels, while a reciprocal right was
denied to the French marine. All these complaints, however, were dis
allowed, upon grounds which wfill not now' be questioned.
Nor were the relations between the United States and Great Britain les?,
disturbed. Besides having offended earlierand more flagrantly than Franceagainst our neutrality, Great Britain still, in violation of the Treaty of In
dependence, held the military posts on our Western frontiers, and, through,
them, the control of the disaffected Indian tribes; nor did she seem un
willing, amidst our domestic distractions, to provoke a new trial of our/

f)

ability to maintain the independence she had so reluctantly Confessed.
While John Jay opened negotiations with Great Britain, at London, James
Monroe, at Paris, assured the French Directory that Mr. Jay;s object was
to obtain cofnpensation for spoliations, with an immediate restitution of
the Western posts; and that he was positively forbidden from weakening
the engagements, existing between the United States and France. These
assurances were effectual. Early in 1795 the French Directory decreed
that the Treaty of Amity and Commerce should thenceforth be strictly
•observed, and provided for indemnifying those who had suffered by the
embargo at Bordeaux ; and Mr. Monroe began a dispatch with announcing
that a satisfactory arrangement of the claims for spoliations was at hand.
But he closed the communication with a statement, that the ground thus
happily gained had been suddenly lost, by reason of rumored stipulations
injurious to France in the British treaty just then signed at London.
A cloud, of political mystery gathered upon this compact from the day of
its execution, the 19th of November, 1794, until it was finally promulgated
on the 9th of May, 1796. France complained of this concealment as dis
ingenuous ; and she ever afterwards maintained that the United States had
not merely violated their engagements with her, but had even abandoned,
■also, their professed neutrality, by relinquishing the principle that free ships
made free goods, and by giving to England a too favorable standard of con
traband. She therefore pursued her depredations more recklessly than
beforehand with the avowed purpose of compelling the United States to
break their new engagements with Great Britain, her ancient and most in
veterate enemy.
Mr. Monroe was replaced by Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, but France
now refused to receive or recognise a Minister. A new and august com
mission was constituted, consisting of Mr. Pinckney, John Marshall, and
Elbridge Gerry, who, after enduring many insults and baffling many
intrigues, returned to the United States. The United States, apprehending
war with not only France, but Great Britain also, laid the foundations of
their present systems of military and naval defence ; and the controversy
with the former Power ripened into resistance, reprisal, and retaliation.
After two years had thus passed, and the French Directory had consented
to negotiate, Oliver Ellsworth, William R. Davie, and William Vans Mur
ray, proceeded to Paris as ambassadors. They found France just entering
the fourth act of the drama of her Revolution, the Consulate of the youthful
Conqueror of Italy. The American ministers demanded indemnities for
the spoliations, as a sine qua non. The French ministers, at whose head
was Joseph Bonaparte, readily yielded this condition, but insisted at the
samfe time on a recognition and renewal of the ancient treaties, with
national damages for the violation of them, as a sine qua non on their part.
The Americans, declining in every case to continue the ancient treaties,
proposed to, purchase exemption from their most embarrassing stipulations.
They offered ten millions of francs for a release from the article of guaranty,
and three millions of francs for a reduction of the privileges granted to
France by the 17th article of the Treaty of Commerce, to such as were
■allowed by the United States to the most favored nation. France rejected
all such overtures, and the commissioners, respectively receding from their
extreme demands, concluded an accommodation by which the United
'States received compensation for the plunder of vessels not yet condemned,
together with payment of the claims founded upon contracts, and also a
satisfactory designation of articles contraband of war. The claims for
spoliations in cases where condemnation had already passed, the origi
nal sine qua non on our part, together with the reciprocal claims of

France for indemnities, and for a recognition and renewal of the ancient _
treaties, the original sine qua non on the part of France, were reserved by
the following article :
“ Art. 2. The Ministers Plenipotentiary of the two parties not being able to
agree at present respecting the Treaty of Alliance of the 6th of February, 1778, the
Treaty of Amity and Commerce of the same date, and the Convention of the 14th
of November, 1788, nor upon the indemnities mutually due or claimed, the parties
will negotiate further on those subjects.at a convenient time; and until they may
have agreed upon these points, the said Treaties and Conventions shall have no
operation, and the relations of the two countries shall be i^gulated as follows.”
The United States amended the new compact by striking out this second
article altogether, and by adding a new one which limited its duration to'
eight years.
Bonaparte, First Consul, accepted the amendments, with an explana
tion, in these words:
“ Provided, That by this retrenchment the two States renounce their respective
pretensions which are the objects of the said (second) article.”
The United States assented, and the compact was ratified as thus mutu
ally amended.
This is the Convention of 1800. “ The pretensions ” which France
thus relinquished were claims for indemnities for violations of the ancient
treaties by the United States, together with a continuance and a renewal
of those treaties; and the “ pretensions” which the United States thus re
nounced were the claims for indemnities for spoliations upon the property
of American merchants, which are the subjects of the bill now before the
Senate of the United States.
Mr. President, this review discloses—
First. That on the 16th day of February, 1778, and on the 14th Novem
ber, 1788, the United States and France entered into reciprocal political
and commercial engagements mutually beneficial.
Secondly. That, previously to the 30th of September, 1800, France vio
lated her engagements by committing depredations, in which merchants,
citizens of the United States, sustained damages to the amount of twenty
millions of dollars, of which, after allowing all claims adjusted, there still
remains the sum of ten millions of dollars, exclusive of interest.
Thirdly. That the United States negotiated with France for payment of
those damages, and also for a release from their ancient obligations ; and
that France conceded the claims for damages, but demanded national in
demnities for a violation of the treaties by the United States, and also a
continuance and renewal of them.
Fourthly. That the United States renounced their claims for damages, in
consideration of a release by France of the treaties, and of her claims for
damages.
Fifthly. That thus the United States confiscated ten millions of private
property of their merchants, and applied it to the purchase of national
benefits, under a Constitution which declares that private property shall not
be taken for public uses without just compensation to its owners.
It seems to result from these facts, that the United States became imme
diately liable to pay to the American merchants the sums before due to
them by France ; and as this obligation was assumed by the United States
in lieu of their ancient engagements with France, undertaken to secure the
establishment of the national liberty and independence, it becomes in
equity invested with their sacredness and sanctions, and therefore ought to
be regarded as a debt incurred for the attainment of the sovereignty, liberty,
and independence of the United States.
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Why, then, Mr. President, shall not this debt, so ancient,, and apparently
so sacred and so just, be discharged ?
I proceed to review the reasons which have been at various times as
signed.
First. The intrinsic justice of the claims has been questioned.
The very learned and justly distinguished Senator from Missouri, [Mr..
Benton,] in a former debate, stated that France had justified these spo
liations, on the ground that the ships seized were in part laden with goods
belonging to Englishmen, who had borrowed the names of Americans. I
have not been able torfind evidence to support such a pretension. On the
other hand, the diplomatic language of the United States constantly claim
ed that the sufferers were American citizens. Sir, if these claims are spu
rious, then it must be true that either Ellsworth, Marshall, Pinckney,.
Monroe, Morris, Jefferson, Adams the elder, and Washington, were igno
rant of the fact, or that they colluded to defraud France. Neither position
can be true. The claims are therefore just.
An objection raised by the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Hunter] falls
under the same head. It is that the French Government have a list or
table of the claims submitted in 1803, which was presented to the French
Government by the American Commissioners, and which shows that the
French, as the Senator says, suppose that they paid, under the Convention
of 1803, all the claims of American citizens. I have this table before me. If
the honorable Senator will refer to the treaty of 1800, he will find that it
stipulated for the payment of the class specified in that table only—to witt
debts owing on contracts—and that the claims for the spoliations now in
question were omitted expressly on the ground that they were excluded by
the treaty of 1800. Here is the article of that treaty :
“ The debts contracted by one of the two nations with individuals of the other,
or by the individuals of one with the individuals of the other, shall be paid, or the
payment may be prosecuted in the same manner as if there had been no misunder
standing between the two States. But this clause shall not extend to indemnities
claimed on account of captures or confscations.'’—Volume VIII of Statutes at Large,
p. 180.
Then, what is left out of this table ? The reduced amount, in the appre
hension of the Senator from Virginia, [Mr. Hunter,] is just exactly that
portion of the claims left out of the treaty, and which is the subject of the
present bill.
Secondly. It has been objected in late years that the claims belonged to
speculators. Certainly few of the sufferers survive, and soon all will have
departed.- But the claims are property; they were the property of those
sufferers. As property they could be transferred and transmitted by assign
ment, will, and administration. These are only modes in which property
is perpetuated; and this capability of being perpetuated is inherent in it,
and is always rightfully and necessarily recognised and protected by all
Governments, with proper limitations. Individual property is the ballast of
the State. Wo to the State that casts it overboard. That State is sure to
drift away, and to break upon rocks. But the allegation that speculators
have purchased these claims is denied, while the bill protects,the public if
it be true. None but a lawful assignee can take any benefit from the bill,
nor can he receive in any case more than he actually paid for the claim.
Thirdly. It is said that the evidences of the claims and of title must neces
sarily be loose and inconclusive.
However this may be, the fault does not rest with the claimants, while
the loss will fall upon them. Moreover, they must produce legal evidence.
The United States can justly ask no more.
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Fourthly. It is denied that 'the United States exchanged a release-of the
claims for a release of the ancient treaties.
We have seen that in form at least the treaty of 1800 was such an ex
change of those equivalents. It was understood to be such an exchange,
in effect, when made. Robert R. Livingston said :
“ It will be well recollected by the distinguished c’ aracters who had the manage
ment of the negotiation, that the payment for illegal captures, with damages and
indemnities, was demanded on the one side, and the renewal of the treaties of 1778
on the other; that they are considered as of equivalent value, and that they only
formed the subject of the second article.”—Letter to Talleyrand, .April 17, 1802.
Napoleon, at St. Helena, declared—
“ That the suppression of the second article at once put an end to the privileges
which France had possessed by the treaties of 1778, and annulled the just claims
which America might have had for injuries done in time of peace.”—Conversation
with Gourgand.
Notwithstanding these and similar contemporaneous expositions, it has
been insisted here by two of my very eminent predecessors, [Mr. Wright
and Mr. Dix,] as well as by others, that this confessed form of the treaty
was a mere diplomatic artifice ; that in fact it was not an exchange of
equivalents ; and that the claims for spoliations were renounced because
they could not be enforced, and not for an adequate and admitted consid
eration. Sir, did Oliver Ellsworth and his colleagues combine to practice
a diplomatic fraud upon France ? Certainly not. Were they then circum
vented ? If we should grant that they were, there would yet remain John
Adams, President in 1800, and Thomas Jefferson, President in 1801, and
the Senate of those years, all equally compromited. Who will impeach
their intelligence or their directness ? Sir, upon whom shall we rely to
vindicate our own less deserved and ephemeral fame, if we strike so rudely
the monuments where these great names lie sleeping.
If the United States can plead fraud in this or any other case, how shall
creditors or allies, individuals or States, learn to distinguish between obli
gations which we admit to be valid and those which we claim a right to
repudiate ?
No, sir ; we cannot raise such a defence. Nor could it be maintained.
No one questions the sincerity of the United States in prosecuting these
claims. France was equally sincere in admitting them, and in preferring
her own. Even in her piratical decrees, she pleaded an overpowering
pressure, and promised reparation :
“ Being informed that some French privateers have taken vessels belonging to
the United States of America, I hasten to engage you to- take the most speedy and
efficacious means to put a stop to this robbery.”—Monge, Minister of Marine, to
the Ordonnateurs of France, March 30, 1793.
Thus France was ingenuous even in her agony of social convulsion.
“ Although it [the treaty of 1778] is reciprocal upon the whole, some provisions
are more specially applicable to the fixed position of the United States, and others
have allusion only to the eventual position of France. The latter has stipulated
few advantages—advantages which do not in any respect injure the United States,
and the lawfulness of which no foreign nation can contest. The French nation will
never renounce them.”—M. Talleyrand to Mr. Gerry, January 18, 1798.
The Convention of 1800 was then, in fact as well as in form, a treaty of
equivalents. Can the United States impeach it now, on the ground of the
inadequacy of the equivalent received ? Certainly not, sir. It is too late;
the parties are changed. The merchants’ claims are just the same, whether
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you received an adequate equivalent, or exchanged their demands for an
insufficient consideration.
Nevertheless, let us pursue the objection. You say that however intrin
sically just the claims may have been,'they were renounced because you
could not collect them without resort to war. I reply, a just claim against
a civilized State is never valueless. If the State is insolvent to-day, it
may become able to pay to-morrow; if it refuses to be just to-day,
it may become more just to-morrow. It is true that the United States
were not bound to declare war for the claims, but it is equally true that
they had no right to confiscate them without indemnity. Thus we have
reached one of the main defences against these claims, viz :
Fifthly. That the ancient treaties had become void as against the United
States, and therefore the release of them by France'in 1800 was valueless.
This argument involves two propositions :
1. That France flagrantly violated those compacts.
2. That the United States perfectly fulfilled them.
1. That France flagrantly violated those compacts. The chief object of
the treaties of 1778 was the establishment of the Liberty, Sovereignty, and
Independence of th$ United States, in the war of the Revolution, and for- .
ever afterwards. France fulfilled her guarantee in the Revolution; But
the merit of that fulfilment is denied. It was said by one of my predeces
sors, [Mr. Dix,] that France was not moved by generosity or sympathy
in entering into the treaties, or in fulfilling them. Sir, a nation whose pride
can condescend so far as to receive benefits, vindicates itself fully by the
exercise of unquestioning and enduring gratitude.
Sir, interest and ambition do indeed too often mingle with the purest
and highest of human motives, not less of States than of individuals. But
the character of motives must be determined by the character of the ac
tions in which they result. Sir, in the strait of the Revolution, your agents
applied for aid, not to the King of France only, but also to the Emperor
of Germany, to the Kings of Spain and Prussia, and to the Grand Duke of
Tuscany. From neither of them could they gain so much as a protest to
discountenance the hire of mercenaries by the German Princes to the
King of Great Britain, to be employed with savage Indian tribes against us.
But France yielded money, volunteers, recognition, and armed alliance.
Was there no merit in that ?
It is true that in our oppressor France found a rival to humble and over
throw. But had Britain no other rival or enemy than France ? If there
were others, why did we not win them to our side ? France did -indeed
exact a guarantee from the United States in exchange for her own. But
did we find any othef Power willing to enter into such an exchange ?
Moreover, France conceded to us all the conquests which should be made
by the allied armies, in the war of the Revolution, except such as would
have been useless to us, and even including the Canadas, of which we
had so recently assisted to deprive her; and she insisted on no remunera
tion after the war should end. Was there no magnanimity in that ?
France was not actuated chiefly by ambition or revenge in making the
engagements of 1778. The People and even the Court were filled with en
thusiastic admiration of the United States and of their cause. Fenelon had
already educated even Royalty in that cause, in the palace and under the
eye of the Grand Monarque. The court, the army, the navy, the rulers and
the people of France, had no standard of a hero but Washington, no model
of a philosopher but Franklin, nor of a State but the United States. Seven
teen years ago I traversed the now deserted and desolate chambers of the
Bourbons of France. Never shall I forget the grateful pride I felt when I
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found among the family pictures of the House of Orleans one which com
memorated the visit of Franklin to the Palais Royale, and among the illus
trations of the national glory at Versailles, one that celebrated the surren
der of Cornwallis. The failure of Louis XVI as a King resulted from his
attempting, like Nerva in ancient Rome, and Pio Nono in modern Rome,
to combine the two incompatible things, the enlargement of popular free
dom with the maintenance of regal power. Nor may we undervalue the
aid received from France. It decided the contest. It cost her more than
three hundred millions of dollars, and hurried her into a Revolution more
exhausting than any other State, in the tide of time, has endured.
. Thus it appears that France fulfilled faithfully and completely her chief
engagements in the treaties of 1778, while it is admitted that she failed
afterwards in less essential obligations, but with protestations of adherence
and promises of reparation.
2. Did the United States completely and absolutely fulfil their reciprocal
obligations? When the war of 1793 broke out, France held all the posses?
sions in America which they had guarantied to her forever, and they were all
exposed. Yet the United States never defended nor attempted to defend
them ; never devoted a life nor even a dollar to than end. Thus, instead
of standing on fulfilment, we are at once brought to the necessity of justi
fying a non-performance of the engagements.' The justification has been
placed on several grounds, viz :
1. That France did not demand fulfilment.
Such an inference is warranted by some of the papers before us, but
there are others which leave the fact very doubtful:
“ I beg you to lay before the President of the United States, as soon as possible,
the decree and the enclosed note, and to obtain from him the Cabinet decision, either
as to the guaranty that I have claimed the fulfilment of for our colonies, &c.”—E,
C. Genet’s Letter of November 14, 1793.
But if France did not demand the performance of the guaranty in the
war, she insisted on its obligation. The United States practically disavowed
and renounced it. The proposition is self-evident. The treaty stipulated
Alliance, when France should demand it. The United States assumed
Neutrality in every event.
2. The non-performance by the United States has been justified on the
ground that the casus foederis of the stipulated guaranty was a defensive
war. and that the war of 1793 was not of that character.
In reply to this argument, I observe, in the first place, that the terms of
the Treaty of Alliance stipulated for the execution of the guaranty in the
case of “ war to break out:” Any war, offensive or defensive. But the
Senator from Virginia [Mr. Hunter] overpowers us with an argument
w’hich by me is irresistible. He says that only a defensive war must have
been contemplated, because a stipulation for aid and alliance in an ag
gressive war would be immoral, unjust, and therefore void. Sir, I acknowl
edge that higher law of universal and eternal justice. And I admit that
all laws of States, and all treaties and compacts between States, which
contravene its sacred provisions, are utterly void and of no effect. I accept
therefore the Senator’s definition of the casus foederis; that it was a defen;sive war. I controvert, and I rest my'cause upon controverting, his as
sumption, that the war of 1793, between the Allied Powers and France,
was on her part an aggressive and not a defensive war.
The very proclamation of neutrality implies a denial of that assumption.
The war therein described is a war “ between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia,
-Great Britain, and the United Netherlands, of the one part, and France, on
•the other.” Why was the aggressor the last party to be named ? But
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History has determined the character of the parties in that momentous ,
contest.
“ The first war of the French Revolution,” says Wheaton, in his History
of the Law of Nations, “originated in the application by the Allied Powers:
of the principle of armed intervention to the internal affairs of France, forthe purpose of checking the progress of her revolutionary principles and
the extension of her military power.” War was declared, indeed, by
France, but only as a reply to the ultimatum of a Restoration of Despotism)
tendered by the Armed League of Enemies.
Thus, sir, we have arrived at the true ground of defence of the neutrality
of 1793, to wit: that performance of the treaty was impossible.
Sir, in a practical sense, performance was impossible. First, on account .
of the condition of France. The parties in 1778 of course expected that.
France would remain an organized State, capable of conducting combined
operations under the treaty, upon a method and towards an end, without.
danger from herself to her ally. But it was not so with France. She be
came not merely revolutionary, but disorganized, having no cettain and:
permanent head, no stable and effective legislature. All the organs of the
State were shattered broken, and scattered. “ Nee color imperii, nec frons
erat ulla Senaius.”
The King, after unavailing changes of ministry, convened the Assembly
of the Notables. After holding the bed of justice, and after attempting to
establish the new plenary courts, he called the States General, which soon
became a Constituent Assembly, absorbing all the functions of government.
Suddenly the People of Paris rose, and brought the King, Queen, and As
sembly, into captivity. A constitutional monarchy rose under the dictation
of the People ; but the King was degraded, condemned, and executed,
and a Republic appeared. The Republic went down before the power of’
cabals, which rapidly succeeded each other, all sustaining their adminis
trations, throughout a reign of terror, by the tribunal of blood. These un
natural convulsions could have but one end—the restoration of the State
by a Dictator. That magistrate, in 1800, appeared in the person of Na
poleon. When and where, before that event, could the United States have
been required to go to the aid of France ? It was well that France had re
gained her liberty ; but her ally had a right, before going into a war with
her against Europe, to see that liberty combined with government and with<
public force—with national morality, with social order, and with civil man- ners. All this was wisely deemed by Washington necessary to secure the
United States against absolute danger, and to render their alliance at all
useful to France. For, on what side were the United States to array them
selves ? With the King while he yet held the reins of state, or with the
National Assembly while abolishing the monarchy? With the ephemeral
Directories, which governed France through the guillotine, or with the
Counter-Revolutionists, struggling to restore internal peace and repose r
Well did Mr. Jefferson say, that if the United States had panted for war
as much as ancient Rome—if their armies had been as effective as those of
Prussia—if their coffers had been full and their debts annihilated—even
then, peace was too precious to be put at hazard, in an enterprise with an
ally thus deranged and disorganized.
And what was the condition of the United States, that they should periH
all in the domestic rage of France and her foreign strife?. Mr. Jefferson^
was no false interpreter, and he thus describedit. “An infant country,,
deep in debt, necessitated to borrow in Europe—without a land or naval*,
force—without a competency of arms and ammunition—with a commerce:
connected beyond the Atlantic—with the certainty of enhancing the price?
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<■ of foreign productions, and of diminishing that of our own—with a Con
stitution little more than four years old, in a state of probation, and not
exempt from foes.” No greater calamity than wrar could then have fallen
upon the United States, nor could war, in any other case, ever come in a
iform so fearful. It was not a fault of Washington, as it was of Cato, not
to see that public affairs were incapable of perfection, and that States
could not be governed without submitting lesser interests to greater. On
the contrary, the measure of his duty was that of Cicero in the consul
ship—to take care that the Republic should suffer no detriment. Well
and wisely did he perform that duty. He could not aid. France, but he
. saved his own country. Forever, then, let the justice and the wisdom of
^Washington, fn that memorable crisis, stand vindicated and established.
But what does all this prove ? Just this, and no more : That circum*Stances, affecting France and the United States equally, unforeseen and
imperious, prevented the United States from even undertaking to perform
their compact with France, in the way stipulated in a particular emergency.
But the circumstances creating this impossibility were not alone the fault
or misfortune of France, but arose in part out of their own condition; and
the omission to perform it assured the safety and promoted the welfare of
the United States. Under such circumstances, the United States owed to
France, if not indemnities for past non-performance, at Teast recognition
and renewal of the ancient treaties. If, then, France was held by the
treaties, because the United States excused their non-performance,, they
were equally bound to extenuate her deviations, under such a pressure,
from prudence, order, and even from justice, if she were willing to make
reparation. None knew so well as they, that France broke the treaties in
Tess essential obligations, not from want of virtue to be faithful, but from
want of magistracy to enforce fidelity. But while France was always
" willing to make reparation, the United States insisted on being absolutely
free from obligations. Jay’s treaty was confessedly injurious to France.
Either that treaty was necessary to the United States, or it was unneces
sary. If it was unnecessary, the complaints of France were just. If ne<cessary, then she was entitled to equivalents. A release from the engage
ments in the ancient treaties was necessary to the United States, or it was
<not. If it was not necessary, then the United States ought not to have
bartered the merchants’ claims away for it. If it was necessary, then the
United States received an adequate equivalent.
Thus it appears that the ancient treaties had not lost their obligation
against the United States by reason of any flagrant violation of them by
France.
Sixthly. The opponents of this bill next insist that the treaties had been
■abrogated by an act of Congress which was passed on the 1th day of July,
4798, viz:
“Whereas the treaties concluded between the United States and France have
' been repeatedly violated on the part of the French Government, and the just claims
• of the United States for reparation of the injuries so committed have been refused,
and their attempts to negotiate an amicable adjustment of all complaints between
the two nations have been repelled with indignity; and whereas, under the author
ity of the French Government, there is yet pursued against the United States a
.system of predatory violence, infracting the. said treaties, and hostile to the rights of
.a free and independent nation—
“ Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
. America in Congress assembled, That the United States are of right freed and exon
erated from the stipulations of the Treaties and of the Consular Convention hereto
fore concluded between the United States and France, and that the same shall not
.henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory on the Government or citizens of the
United States'.”—,Statutes at Large, I, p. 578.
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The treaty-making power is vested, not in Congress, but in the Presi
dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. A valid treaty
can be abrogated only by the power which is competent to make one. A
treaty already void needs no act of Congress or of the President or of the
Senate to abrogate it, while one not void cannot be abrogated except in the
constitutional way.
A treaty, moreover, is the act of two parties. Neither can dissolve it
without the concurrence of the other. The act of Congress, then, left the
obligations of the ancient treaties, so far as France was concerned, and
so far as the United States politically were concerned, just as it found
them.
Seventhly. As a last resort, the opponents of these claims assert that the
release of the ancient treaties was valueless, because they had been abrogated
by war between the two nations.
I waive the objection that these treaties were of such a nature that they
could not be abrogated by war, and I simply deny that any such war oc
curred.
If war did take place, it must, have begun in some way and at some time,,
and have ended in some other way and at some other time.
It is quite certain that France never declared war against the United
States, and equal}', so that the United States never declared war against
France. There were hostilities between them, but hostilities are not
always war. The statute book of the United States shows the nature and
extent of these hostilities.
We were not at war with France on the 14th of January, 1797; for on
that day Congress declared it a misdemeanor for an American to engage
in privateering against nations with whom the United States were at peace,
and we know that France was then regarded as standing in that relation
because the United States afterwards authorized privateering against her
in certain cases.
We were not at war with France on the 28th of May, 1798; for on that
day Congress directed that a provisional army should be raised in the event
of a declaration of war against the United States, or of actual invasion of
their territory by a foreign Power, or of imminent danger of such invasion.
Nor were we at war with France on the 13th of June, 1798; for on that,
day Congress suspended commercial relations with France—a measure
quite unnecessary, if war had already broken up that intercourse.
Nor were we at war on the 25th of June, 1798 ; for on that day Con
gress authorized American vessels to oppose and resist searches, restraints,,
and seizures, by armed vessels of France. Such opposition and resistancewould have needed no sanction if committed in open war.
We were not at war with France on the 2d day of March, 1799 ; for on
that day Congress authorized the President to levy and organize addi
tional regiments, in case war should break out between the United States
and a foreign European Power.
We were not yet at war on the 20th of February, 1800 ; for on that day
Congress directed that all further enlistments should be suspended, unless
during the recess of Congress and during the existing differences (which
existing differences the sequel wall show were not war) between the United
States and France, or imminent danger of invasion of the territory of theUnited States by that Republic, should, in the opinion of the President, be
deemed to have arisen.
Finally, we were not at war on the 30th of September, 1800 ; for on that
day the then “existing differences” between France and the United
States were adjusted by a Convention, concluded on the basis that al though,.
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in the opinion of the United States, the aggressions of France would
“well have justified an immediate declaration of war, yet that they had
nevertheless been desirous of maintaining peace, and of leaving open the
door of reconciliation with France, and had therefore contented themselves
with preparations for defence, and measures calculated to protect their
commerce.”—Instructions to American Ministers at Paris, October 22.
1799.
Thus, sir. it is shown, that if a war existed, neither its beginning, nor its
end, nor the way of either, can ever be ascertained, and that the United
States were profoundly ignorant of its existence. If any man in France,
more than another, would have known the existence of such a war, that
man was Napoleon Bonaparte. Yet we have seen that the music of this
“softand silken war” never reached the ear of the Great Captain of
France. For, in speaking of the spoliations, he described them as having
been committed “in time of peace.” It was hot thus with the other ene
mies of France, while he was at liberty within her borders, nor has it been so
that the countrymen of Washington, of Taylor, and of Scott, have con
ducted their campaigns in other conflicts.
It appears from this review that the treaties in question had been recog
nised always by both parties, and broken in parts by both, but under cir
cumstances of excuse and palliation ; and that they were therefore in force
when the United States and France mutually agreed to extinguish them,
on the condition of a release of the claims for indemnities. Of the value
of that agreement it is unnecessary to say more, than that without it the
United States might have been held by the ancient treaty of alliance to have
followed to some extent the varying fortunes of France through her wars
during the Consulate and the Empire, until she found repose, from com
plete exhaustion, on the field of Waterloo.
,
*
No reason for rejecting these claims remains, except that they have not
been paid heretofore. But mere lapse of time pays no debts, and dis
charges no obligations. There has been no release, no waiver, no neglect,
no delay, by the creditors. They have been here twenty-five times in fifty
years ; that is to say, they have appeared in their successive generations,
before every Congress since their claims against the United States accrued.
Against such claims and such creditors there is no prescription.
It is said, indeed, that the nation is unable to pay these claims now. I
put a single question in reply : When will the nation be more affluent
than now ?
The Senator [Mr. Hunter] says, again, that, if the debts are just, we
should pay the whole, and not a moiety ; and that if the claims are unjust,
then the bill proposes a gratuity—that in the one case the appropriation is too
small, and in the other too great. This is the plea of him who, I'“think it
was in Ephesus, despoiled the statue of Jupiter of its golden robe, saying,
Gold was too warm in summer, and too cold in winter, for the shoulders of
the god.
Sir, Commerce is one of the great occupations of this nation. It is the
fountain of its revenues, as it is the chief agent of its advancement in civ
ilization and enlargement of Empire. It is exclusively the care of the
Federal authorities. It is for the protection of Commerce that they pass
Jaws, make treaties, build fortifications, and maintain navies upon all the
seas. But justice and good faith are surer defences than treaties, fortifica
tions, or naval armaments. Justice and good faith constitute .true national
honor, which feels a stain more keenly than a wound. The nation that
lives in wealth and in the enjoyment of power, and yet under unpaid obli
gations, lives in dishonor and in danger. The nation that would be truly
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great, or even merely safe, must practice 'an austere and self-denying mo
rality.
The faith of canonized ancestors, whose fame now belongs to mankind,
is pledged to the payment of these debts. “ Let the merchants send hither
well-authenticated evidence of their claims, and proper measures shall be
taken for their relief.” This was the promise of Washington. The evi
dence is here. Let us redeem the sacred and venerable engagement.
Through his sagacity and virtue, we have inherited with it ample and abun
dant resources, and to them we ourselves have added the newly discovered
wealth of Southern plains, and the hidden treasures of the Western coasts.
With the opening of the half century, we are entering upon new and
profitable intercourse with the ancient Oriental States and races, while we
are grappling more closely to us the new States on our own Continent.
Let us signalize an epoch so important in commerce and politics by justly
discharging ourselves forever from the yet remaining obligations of the
first and most sacred of all our national engagements. While we are grow
ing over all lands, let us be rigorously just to other nations, just to the
several States, and just to every class and to every citizen ; in short, just in
all our administration, and just towards all mankind. So shall Prosperity
crown all our enterprises—nor shall any disturbance within nor danger
from abroad come nigh unto us, nor alarm us for the safety of Fireside, or
Fane, or Capitol.

